We construct an identity-based encryption (IBE) scheme that is tightly secure in a very strong sense. Specifically, we consider a setting with many instances of the scheme and many encryptions per instance. In this setting, we reduce the security of our scheme to a variant of a simple assumption used for a similar purpose by Chen and Wee (Crypto 2013). The security loss of our reduction is O(k) (where k is the security parameter). Our scheme is the first IBE scheme to achieve this strong flavor of tightness under a simple assumption.
Introduction
Tight security. For many cryptographic primitives, we currently cannot prove security directly. Hence, we typically reduce the security of a given scheme to the hardness of a computational problem, in the sense that every successful attack on the scheme yields a successful problem solver. Now it is both a theoretically and practically interesting question to look at the loss of such a reduction. Informally, the loss of a reduction quantifies the difference between the success of a hypothetical attacker on the cryptographic scheme, and the success of the derived problem solver. From a theoretical perspective, for instance, the loss of a reduction can also be viewed as a quantitative measure of (an upper bound for) the "distance" between primitive and assumption. But "tight" (or, "loss-free") reductions are also desirable from a practical perspective: the tighter a reduction, the better are the security guarantees we can give for a specific instance of the scheme. Hence, we can recommend smaller keylengths (which lead to more efficiency) for schemes with tighter security reduction.
However, in most practical usage scenarios, a cryptographic primitive is used multiple times. (For instance, in a typical multi-user encryption scenario, many instances of the encryption scheme are used to produce even more ciphertexts.) Hence, tight security reductions become particularly meaningful when they reduce an attacker on the whole system (with many instances of the cryptographic scheme) to a problem solver. In fact, while for many primitives (such as secret-key [2] or public-key [3] encryption), one-instance security is known to imply multiinstance security, the corresponding security guarantees for concrete schemes may indeed vanish in the number of instances [2] .
Existing tightly secure schemes. The loss of security reductions has been considered explicitly by Bellare et al. [2] for the case of encryption schemes. The first "somewhat tight" reductions (whose loss is independent of the number of instances of the scheme, but not of the number of ciphertexts) for public-key encryption (PKE) schemes could be given in [4] . In the following years, more tight (or somewhat tight) reductions for encryption schemes were constructed in the random oracle model [14, 10, 7] , or from "q-type" assumptions [15, 16] . 1 However, only recently, the first PKE schemes emerged [18, 1, 20] whose tight security (in the multi-instance, multi-ciphertext setting) can be proved under simple assumptions in the standard model. 2 Even more recently, identity-based encryption (IBE) schemes with "somewhat tight" security (under simple assumptions) have been constructed [11, 6] . (This required new techniques, since it is not clear how to extend the techniques of [18, 1, 20] to the IBE setting.) In this case, "somewhat tight" means that their security reduction loses only a small multiplicative factor, but still considers the standard IBE security experiment [9] with one encryption and one instance of the scheme. Nonetheless, while the IBE schemes from [11, 6] are not proved tightly secure in a multi-user, multi-ciphertext setting, these schemes imply tightly secure PKE schemes (even in the multi-user, multi-ciphertext setting) when plugged into the transformations of [9, 18, 20] . 3 Our contribution. In this work, we construct the first IBE scheme with an almost tight security reduction in the multi-instance, multi-ciphertext scenario. Our reduction is only almost tight, since it loses a factor of O(k), where k is the security parameter. However, we stress that this loss is independent of the number of ciphertexts, revealed user secret keys, or instances of the scheme. In our security reduction, we rely on a computational assumption in compositeorder pairing-friendly groups; this assumption is a variant of an assumption used by Chen and Wee [11] for their IBE scheme, and in particular simple in the above sense. We note that a conversion to the prime-order setting using the techniques from [17, 21, 13, 19 ] (see also [5] ) seems plausible-specifically since Chen and Wee [11] already describe such a conversion for their assumption-, but we leave such a conversion as an open problem.
Our approach. Our scheme is a variant of the IBE scheme by Chen and Wee [11] (which is almost tightly secure in the one-instance, one-ciphertext setting), and our proof strategy draws heavily from theirs. Hence, to describe our techniques, let us first briefly sketch their strategy.
In a nutshell, Chen and Wee start with a real security game, in which an adversary A receives a master public key mpk of the scheme, as well as access to arbitrarily many user secret keys usk id for adversarially chosen identities id . At some point, A selects a fresh challenge identity id * and two messages M * 0 , M * 1 , and then receives the encryption C * id * ← Enc(mpk , id * , M b ) (under identity id * ) of one of these messages. After potentially querying more user secret keys (for identities id = id * ), A eventually outputs a guess b * for b. If b * = b, we say that A wins. Chen and Wee then show security by gradually changing this game (being careful not to significantly decrease A's success), until A trivially cannot win (except by guessing).
As a first preparatory change, Chen and Wee use the user secret key usk id * to construct the challenge ciphertext C * id * . (This way, the encryption random coins for C * id * do not have to be known to the security game.) Additionally C * id * is now of a special, "pseudo-normal" form that will later enable a gradual randomization of the encrypted message. The core of the proof then consists of a number of hybrid steps, in which the distribution of all generated user secret keys (including the user secret key usk id * used to generate C * id * ) is modified. Concretely, in the i-th hybrid game, each used usk id contains an additional "blinding term" of the form R(id | i ), where id | i is the i-bit prefix of id , and R is a truly random function. Eventually, each user secret key usk id will be fully randomized by a truly random value R(id ). In particular, at this point, the key usk id * used to prepare C * id * is blinded by a fresh random value R(id * ). By the special "pseudo-normal" form of C * id * , this means that the corresponding encrypted message is also blinded, and A's view is finally independent of the challenge bit b.
We keep this high-level proof structure, extending it of course to multiple ciphertexts and multiple instances of the scheme. However, as we will explain below, the way Chen and Wee gradually introduce the blinding terms R(id | i ) does not immediately extend to many ciphertexts or instances; hence, we need to deviate from their proof strategy here.
The problem. Specifically, Chen and Wee move from the (i − 1)-th to the i-th hybrid through a single reduction as follows: first, they guess the i-th bit id * i of the challenge identity id * . Then, they set up things such that (a) all user secret keys for identities id with id i = id * i (i.e., that coincide in the i-th bit with id * ) behave as in the previous hybrid (i.e., carry a blinding term R(id | i−1 )), (b) all user secret keys for identities id with id i = 1 − id * i carry a blinding term of R(id | i−1 ) · R (id | i−1 )). Depending on the input of the reduction, we have either that R = 1 (such that the overall blinding term is R(id | i−1 )), or that R is an independently random function. (In particular, all usk id with id i = 1 − id * i contain an embedded computational challenge R .) Depending on whether or not R = 1, this setup simulates the (i − 1)-th or the i-th hybrid. However, we remark that the setup of Chen and Wee only allows to generate "pseudo-normal" challenge ciphertexts C * id * for identities id * with the initially guessed i-th bit id * i . (Intuitively, any pseudo-normal ciphertext for an identity id with id i = 1 − id * i would "react with" an additional blinding term R (id | i−1 ) in usk id , allowing to trivially solve the computational challenge.)
Hence, in their i-th game hop, only challenge ciphertexts for identities with the same i-th bit can be generated. Thus, their approach cannot in any obvious way be extended to multiple challenge ciphertexts for different identities. (For similar reasons, a generalization to multiple instances of the scheme fails.)
Our solution. In order to move from the (i−1)-th to the i-th hybrid, we thus follow a different strategy that involves three reductions. The main technical ingredient in our case is the ability to distribute the blinding terms R(id | i ) in user secret keys into two different "compartments" (i.e., subgroups) of the composite-order group we are working in. (In particular, a term R(id | i ) in one compartment can be changed independently of terms in the other compartment.)
More specifically, recall that in the (i − 1)-th hybrid, all user secret keys carry an additional R(id | i−1 ) blinding term, and all challenge ciphertexts are pseudo-normal (in the sense that they "react with" the blinding terms in user secret keys). In our first step, we move all blinding terms R(id | i−1 ) in the usk id into the two compartments, depending on the i-th bit of id . (That is, if id i = 0, then the corresponding blinding term R(id | i−1 ) goes into the first compartment, and if id i = 1, then it goes into the second.)
In our second step, we can now treat the embedded blinding terms for id i = 0 and id i = 1 separately. In particular, since these cases are now "decoupled" by being in different compartments, we can completely re-randomize the underlying random function R in exactly one of those compartments. (This does not lead to trivial distinctions of the computational challenge since we do not introduce new blinding terms that would "react with" pseudo-normal ciphertexts and thus become easily detectable. Instead, we simply decouple existing blinding terms in different subgroups.) Note however that since now different random functions, say, R and R, determine the blinding terms used for identities with id i = 0 and id i = 1, we essentially obtain blinding terms that depend on the first i (and not only i − 1) bits of id .
Finally, we revert the first change and move all blinding terms in the usk id into one compartment. In summary, this series of three moves has thus created blinding terms that depend on the first i bits of id . Thus, we have moved to the i-th hybrid. If we follow the high-level strategy of Chen and Wee again, this yields a sequence of O(k) reductions that show the security of our IBE scheme. (From a conceptual perspective, it might also be interesting to note that none of our reductions needs to guess, e.g., an identity bit.)
Outline of the paper. After introducing some preliminary definitions in Section 2, we explain the necessary algebraic structure (mentioned in the "compartment discussion" above) of "extended nested dual system groups" (ENDSGs) in Section 3. (This structure extends a similar structure of Chen and Wee [11] .) In Section 4, we present our IBE scheme from ENDSGs, and in Section 5, we show how to instantiate ENDSGs in composite-order pairingfriendly groups.
Preliminaries
Notation. For n ∈ N, let [n] := {1, . . . , n}, and let k ∈ N be the security parameter. For a finite set S, we denote by s ← S the process of sampling s uniformly from S. For an algorithm A, let y ← A(k, x) be the process of running A on input k, x with access to uniformly random coins and assigning the result to y. (We may omit to mention the k-input explicitly and assume that all algorithms take k as input.) To make the random coins r explicit, we write A(k, x; r). We say an algorithm A is probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) if the running time of A is polynomial in k. A function f : N → R is negligible if it vanishes faster than the inverse of any polynomial (i.e., if ∀c∃k 0 ∀k ≥ k 0 : |f (k)| ≤ 1/k c ). Further, we write vectors in bold font, e.g., v = (v 1 , . . . , v n ) for a vectors of length n ∈ N and with components v 1 , . . . , v n . (We may also write v = (v i ) i∈ [n] or even v = (v i ) i in this case.) In the following, we use a component-wise
, and
. . , s vn ). For two random variables X, Y , we denote with SD (X ; Y ) is the statistical distance of X and Y . We might also say that X and Y are ε-close if SD (X ; Y ) ≤ ε.
Identity-based encryption. An identity-based encryption (IBE) scheme IBE with identity space ID and message space M consists of the five PPT algorithms Par, Gen, Ext, Enc, Dec.
Parameter sampling Par(k, n), on input a security parameter k and an identity length parameter n ∈ N, outputs public parameters pp and secret parameters sp. (We assume that Ext, Enc, and Dec have implicitly access to pp.) Key generation Gen(pp, sp), on input pp and sp, outputs a master public key mpk and a master secret key msk . User secret key extraction Ext(msk , id ), given msk and an identity id ∈ ID, outputs a user secret key usk id associated with id . Encryption Enc(mpk , id , M ), given mpk , an identity id ∈ ID, and a message M ∈ M, outputs an id -associated ciphertext C id . Decryption Dec(usk id , C id ), given usk id for an identity id , and ciphertext C id , outputs M ∈ M ∪ {⊥}. For correctness, we require that for any k, n ∈ N, for all (pp, sp) ← Par(k, n), for all (mpk , msk ) ← Gen(pp, sp), for all id ∈ ID, for all usk id ← Ext(msk , id ), for all M ∈ M, and for all C id ← Enc(mpk , id , M ), Dec satisfies Dec(usk id , C id ) = M . For security, we define multi-instance, multi-ciphertext IBE security, dubbed (µ, q)-IBE-IND-CPA security, for (µ, q) ∈ N 2 , as follows.
(Weak) (µ, q)-IBE-IND-CPA security. An IBE scheme IBE defined as above is (µ, q)-IBE-IND-CPA-secure if and only if any PPT adversary A succeeds in the following experiment only with probability at most negligibly larger than 1/2. Let Enc (mpk , id , b, M 0 , M 1 ) be a PPT auxiliary encryption oracle that, given a master public key mpk , a challenge identity id ∈ ID, a bit b ∈ {0, 1}, and two messages M 0 , M 1 ∈ M, outputs a challenge ciphertext C id ← Enc(mpk , id , M b ). First, A gets honestly generated public parameter pp and master public keys (mpk 1 , . . . , mpk µ ). During the experiment, A may adaptively query Ext(msk j , ·)-oracles and Enc (mpk j , ·, b, ·, ·)-oracles, for corresponding mpk j , msk j and a (uniform) bit b ← {0, 1}, for all j ∈ [µ]. Eventually, A outputs a guess b * . We say that A is valid if and only if A never queries an Ext(msk j , ·) oracle on an identity id for which it
if A is valid and b = b * then return 1 else return 0 has already queried the corresponding Enc (mpk j , ·, b, ·, ·) oracle (and vice versa); each message pair A selected as input to Enc contained only equal-length messages; and A has only queried its Enc -oracles at most q times per j-instance. We say that A succeeds if and only if A is valid and b = b * . Concretely, the previous described experiment is given in Figure 1 and denoted Exp
. Further, we define the advantage function for any PPT A as
is negligible for all weak PPT adversaries A. Here, A is weak if it never requests challenge ciphertexts for the same scheme instance and identity twice (i.e., if it never queries any Enc (mpk j , ·, b, ·, ·) oracle twice with the same identity id ).
Finally, we remark that the one-instance, one-ciphertext notion (1, 1)-IBE-IND-CPA is the standard notion of IBE security considered in, e.g., [9, 11, 6] .
Pairings. Let G, H, G T be cyclic groups of order N . A pairing e : G × H → G T is a map that is bilinear (i.e., for all g, g ∈ G and h, h ∈ H, we have e(g · g , h) = e(g, h) · e(g , h) and e(g, h · h ) = e(g, h) · e(g, h )), non-degenerate (i.e., for generators g ∈ G, h ∈ H, we have that e(g, h) ∈ G T is a generator), and efficiently computable.
3 Extended nested dual system groups (Nested) dual system groups. Nested dual system groups (NDSG) [11] can be seen as a variant of dual system groups (DSG) [12] which itself are based on the dual system framework introduced by Waters [21] . NDSGs were recently defined by Chen and Wee and enabled to prove the first IBE (almost) tightly and fully secure under simple assumptions. In the following, based on NDSGs, we construct a new notion we call extended nested dual system groups.
A variant of nested dual system groups. We introduce a variant of Chen and Wee's nested dual system groups (NDSG) [11] , dubbed extended NDSG (ENDSG). (Mainly, we re-use and extend the notions from [11] .) Further, let G(k, n ) be a group generator that, given integers k and n , generates the tuple (G, H, G T , N, (g p 1 , . . . , g p n ), (h p 1 , . . . , h p n ), g, h, e), for a pairing e : G × H → G T , for composite-order groups G, H, G T , all of known group order N = p 1 · · · p n , for k-bit primes (p i ) i and integer n ∈ O(1). Further, g and h are generators of G and H, and (g p i ) i and (h p i ) i are generators of the (proper) subgroups G p i ⊂ G and H p i ⊂ H of order |G p i | = |H p i | = p i , respectively. In this setting, an ENDSG ENDSG consists of algorithms SampP, SampG, SampH, SampG, SampG:
Parameter sampling. SampP(k, n), given security parameter k and parameter n ∈ N, samples (G, H, G T , N, (g p 1 , . . . , g p n ), (h p 1 , . . . , h p n ), g, h, e) ← G(k, n ), for a constant integer n determined by SampP, and outputs public parameters pp = (G, H, G T , N, g, h, e, m, n, pars) and secret parameters sp = ( h, h, pars, pars), where m : H → G T is a linear map, h, h are nontrivial H-elements, and pars, pars, pars may contain arbitrary additional information used by SampG, SampH, and SampG and SampG.
G-group sampling. SampG(pp), given parameter pp, outputs g = (g 0 , . . . , g n ) ∈ G n+1 .
H-group sampling. SampH(pp), given parameter pp, outputs h = (h 0 , . . . , h n ) ∈ H n+1 .
Semi-functional G-group sampling 1. SampG(pp, sp), given parameters pp and sp, outputs g = ( g 0 , . . . , g n ) ∈ G n+1 .
Semi-functional G-group sampling 2. SampG(pp, sp), given parameters pp and sp, outputs
Correctness of ENDSG. For correctness, for all k ∈ N, for all integers n = n(k) > 1, for all pp, where pp is the first ouput of SampP(k, n), we require:
Associativity. For all (g 0 , . . . , g n ) ← SampG(pp) and for all (h 0 , . . . , h n ) ← SampH(pp), we have e(g 0 , h i ) = e(g i , h 0 ), for all i.
Projective. For all s ← Z * N , for all g 0 which is the first output of SampG(pp; s), for all h ∈ H, we have m(h) s = e(g 0 , h).
Security of ENDSG.
For security, for all k ∈ N, for all integers n = n(k) > 1, for all (pp, sp) ← SampP(k, n), we require:
Orthogonality. For m specified in pp, for h, h specified in sp, we have m( h) = m( h) = 1. For g 0 , g 0 , and g 0 that are the first outputs of SampG(pp), SampG(pp, sp), and SampG(pp, sp), respectively, we have that e(g 0 , h) = 1, e(g 0 , h) = 1, e( g 0 , h) = 1, and e( g 0 , h) = 1.
G-and H-subgroups. The outputs of SampG, SampG, and SampG are distributed uniformly over the generators of different nontrivial subgroups of G n+1 (that only depend on pp) of coprime order, respectively, while the output of SampH is uniformly distributed over the generators of a nontrivial subgroup of H n+1 (that only depends on pp).
Non-degeneracy.
For h specified in sp and for g 0 which is the first output of SampG(pp, sp), it holds that e( g 0 , h) is uniformly distributed over the generators of a nontrivial subgroup of G T (that only depends on pp). Similarly, e( g 0 , h) is uniformly distributed over the generators of a nontrivial subgroup of G T (that only depends on pp), where h is specified in sp and g 0 is the first output of SampG(pp, sp).
Left-subgroup indistinguishability 1 (LS1). For any PPT adversary D, we have that the function
Left-subgroup indistinguishability 2 (LS2). For any PPT adversary D, we have that the function
is negligible in k, where g, g ← SampG(pp), g, g ← SampG(pp, sp), g ← SampG(pp, sp), for h and h specified in sp.
Nested-hiding indistinguishability (NH). For any PPT adversary D, for all integers q = q (k), the function
(Informal) comparison of NDSGs and ENDSGs. Loosely speaking, in contrast to the NDSGs from [11] , ENDSGs have a second semi-functional G-group sampling algorithm SampG as well as a second nontrivial H-element in sp (i.e., h). Further, we omit the SampGT-algorithm.
Concerning the ENDSG properties, we extend the NDSG properties and assumptions appropriately and introduce one additional assumption (i.e., LS2).
A variant of the IBE of Chen and Wee [11] .
We are now ready to present our variant of Chen and Wee's IBE scheme [11] . As a basic building block we use an ENDSG ENDSG = (SampP, SampG, SampH, SampG, SampG) from Section 3. Besides, for groups G T (defined below), let UH be a family of universal hash functions H : G T → {0, 1} k such that for any nontrivial subgroup G T ⊂ G T , and for H ← U H, X ← G T , and U ← {0, 1} k , we have SD ((H, H(X)) ; (H, U )) = O(2 −k ). Let IBE = (Par, Gen, Ext, Enc, Dec) with identity space ID = {0, 1} n , for n = n(k), and message space M = {0, 1} k be defined as follows:
Parameter generation. Par(k, n) samples (pp , sp ) ← SampP(k, 2n), for pp = (G, H, G T , N, g, h, e, m, 2n, pars) and sp = ( h, h, pars, pars)), and H ← UH, and then outputs the public and secret parameters (pp, sp), where pp = (pp , H) and sp = sp .
Key generation. Gen(pp, sp), given parameters pp and sp, samples msk ← H, and outputs a master public key mpk := (pp, m(msk )) and a master secret key msk .
Secret-key extraction. Ext(msk , id ), given msk ∈ H and an identity id = (id 1 . . . id n ) ∈ ID, samples (h 0 , . . . , h 2n ) ← SampH(pp) and outputs a user secret key
Encryption. Enc(mpk , id , M ), given mpk = (pp, m(msk )), an identity id = (id 1 . . . id n ) ∈ ID, and a message M ∈ M, computes (g 0 , . . . , g 2n ) := SampG(pp; s), for s ← Z * N , and g T := m(msk ) s (= e(g 0 , msk )), and outputs a ciphertext
Decryption. Dec(usk id , C id ), given a user secret key usk id =: (K 0 , K 1 ) and a ciphertext C id =: (C 0 , C 1 , C 2 ), outputs
Correctness of IBE. We have
for id = id . ( * ) holds due to ENDSG's associativity and projective properties.
(µ, q)-IBE-IND-CPA security of IBE. We base our high-level proof strategy on the IBE-IND-CPA proof strategy of Chen and Wee [11] , but deviate on the low level. First, we define auxiliary secret-key extraction Ext and auxiliary encryption Enc, random functions R j,i and R j,i , pseudo-normal ciphertexts, semi-functional type-(·, i) ciphertexts, and semi-functional type-i user secret keys similarly to [11] :
Auxiliary secret-key extraction. Ext(pp, msk , id ; h), given parameter pp, master secret key msk , an identity id = id 1 . . . id n ∈ ID, and h = (h 0 , . . . , h 2n ) ∈ (H) 2n+1 , outputs a user secret key
Auxiliary encryption function. Enc(pp, id , M ; msk , g), given parameter pp, identity id = id 1 . . . id n ∈ ID, message M ∈ M, master secret key msk , and g = (g 0 , . . . , g 2n ) ∈ (G) 2n+1 , outputs a ciphertext
Random function families. Let id | i := id 1 . . . id i be the i-bit prefix of an identity id , and let ID| i := {0, 1} i . For an instance j and i ∈ [n] ∪ {0}, consider functions R j,i :
, id | i → γ j,id| i are independently and truly random.
Pseudo-normal ciphertexts. Pseudo-normal ciphertexts are generated as
for uniform g = (g 0 , . . . , g 2n ) ← SampG(pp) and g = ( g 0 , . . . , g 2n ) ← SampG(pp, sp). (Hence, pseudo-normal ciphertexts have G-components sampled from SampG.)
Semi-functional type-(∧, i) and type-(∼, i) ciphertexts. Let R j,i and R j,i be random functions as defined above. Semi-functional ciphertexts of type (∧, i) are generated as
while semi-functional ciphertexts of type (∼, i) are generated as
where g = (g 0 , . . . , g 2n ) ← SampG(pp), g = ( g 0 , . . . , g 2n ) ← SampG(pp), and g = ( g 0 , . . . , g 2n ) ← SampG(pp), while (1) and (2) hold due to ENDSG's properties.
Semi-functional type-i user secret keys. Let R j,i and R j,i be defined as above. For h = (h 0 , . . . , h 2n ) ← SampH(pp), semi-functional type-i user secret keys are generated as 
for group generator G defined as above.
Proof. We show the (µ, q)-IBE-IND-CPA security of IBE for any weak PPT adversary A in a sequence of games where we successively change the games until we arrive at a game where A has only negligible advantage (i.e., success probability of 1/2) in the sense of (µ, q)-IBE-IND-CPA. Let S A,j be the event that A succeeds in Game j. We give an overview how the challenge ciphertexts and user secret keys are generated in Table 1 .
Game 0. Game 0 is the (µ, q)-IBE-IND-CPA experiment as defined above. User secret keys for id 
Proof. In Game 0, all challenge ciphertexts are normal in the sense of IBE while in Game 1, all challenge ciphertexts are pseudo-normal. In the following, we give a description and its analysis of a LS1 distinguisher that uses any efficient IBE-attacker in the (µ, q)-IBE-IND-CPA sense.
Description. The challenge input is provided as (pp, T), where T is either g or g g, for pp = (G, H, G T , N, g, h, e, m, 2n, pars), g ← SampG(pp), and g ← SampG(pp, sp). First, D samples (msk j ) j ← (H) µ , sets mpk j := (pp, H, m(msk j )), for all j, for H ← UH, and sends (mpk j ) j to A. During the experiment, D answers instance-j secret key extraction queries to oracle Ext(msk j , ·), for id ∈ ID, as Ext(pp, msk j , id ; SampH(pp)), Analysis. The provided master public keys and the A-requested user secret keys yield the correct distribution and are consistent in the sense of Game 0 and Game 1. Due to ENDSG's G-and H-subgroups property, we have that T is uniformly distributed over the generators of a nontrivial subgroup of G 2n+1 . Hence, T s , for s ← Z * N , is distributed uniformly over the generators of a nontrivial subgroup of G 2n+1 and, thus, all challenge ciphertexts yield the correct distribution in the sense of Game 0 and Game 1. If T = g, then the challenge ciphertexts are distributed identically as in Game 0. Otherwise, i.e., if T = g g, then the challenge ciphertexts are distributed identically as in Game 1. Hence, (2) follows. 
Proof. In this bridging step, we argue that each instance-j master secret key msk j , with msk j ← H, generated as in Game 1 and the (implicit) instance-j master secret keys msk j , with msk j := msk j · R j,0 (ε) · R j,0 (ε), for msk j ← H and R j,0 , R j,0 defined as above, generated as in Game 2.1.0, are identically distributed, for all j. Note that the master public keys for A contain (m(msk j )) j ; but since ((m(msk j )) j = (m(msk j )) j , which is due to the orthogonality property of ENDSG, no R j,0 -information and no R j,0 -information is given out in the master public keys. Further, since (msk j ) j and (msk j ) j are identically distributed, it follows that (3) holds. 
for all i ∈ [n].
Proof. In Game 2.i.0, we have semi-functional type-(∧, i − 1) challenge ciphertexts while in Game 2.i.1, challenge ciphertexts are semi-functional of type (∼, i − 1) if and only if the i-th challenge identity bit is 1.
Description. The challenge input is provided as (pp, h h, g g , T), where T is either g g or g g, for pp as before, for h, h specified in sp, for g, g ← SampG(pp), g, g ← SampG(pp, sp), and g ← SampG(pp, sp). First, D samples (msk j ) j ← (H) µ , sets mpk j := (pp, H, m(msk j )), for all j, for H ← UH, for m specified in pp, and sends (mpk j ) j to A. Further, D defines a truly random function R :
During the experiment, D answers instance-j secret key extraction queries to oracle Ext(msk j , ·) as
for id ∈ ID and all j. (Again, we assume that A queries at most q user secret keys per instance and we set id | 0 = {0, 1} 0 =: ε.) A may adaptively query its Enc -oracle; for instance-j challenge identity id * j,i = id * j,i ,1 . . . , id * j,i ,n ∈ ID and equal-length messages (M * j,i ,0 , M * j,i ,1 ), D returns
. Eventually, A outputs a guess b . D outputs 1 if b = b and A is valid in the sense of (µ, q)-IBE-IND-CPA, else outputs 0.
Analysis. The master public keys yield the correct distribution as well as the requested user secret keys (which is due to ENDSG's G-and H-subgroups property, i.e., the output of SampH is uniformly distributed over the generators of a nontrivial subgroup of H 2n+1 ). For the challenge ciphertexts, note that g g and T are uniformly distributed over the generators of their respective nontrivial subgroup of G 2n+1 and, hence, (g g ) s and T s , for s ← Z * N , are distributed uniformly over the generators of their respective nontrivial G 2n+1 -subgroup as well. If T = g g, then the challenge ciphertexts are distributed identically as in Game 2.i.0. Otherwise, if T = g g, then the challenge ciphertexts are distributed identically as in Game 2.i.1 (where, in both cases, ENDSG's orthogonality and non-degeneracy properties hold; thus, h and h must contain coprime nontrivial elements and the challenge ciphertexts yield the correct distribution). Hence, (4) follows. Description. The challenge input is (pp, h, h, g −(2i−1) , g −2i , (T 1,1 , . . . , T µ,q )), where T j,i equals either (h j,i ,0 , . . . , h j,i ,2n ) or (h j,i ,0 , . . . , h j,i ,2i−1 · ( h) γ j,i , h j,i ,2i · ( h) γ j,i , . . . , h j,i ,2n ), for pp as before, h, h specified as in sp, for g ← SampG(pp, sp), for g ← SampG(pp, sp), for (h j,i ,0 , . . . , h j,i ,2n ) ← SampH(pp), and for uniform γ j,i , γ j,i ← Z * ord(H) , for all (j, i ) ∈ [µ] × [q ]. D samples (msk j ) j ← (H) µ , sets mpk j := (pp, H, m(msk j )), for all j, for H ← UH, for m specified in pp, and sends (mpk j ) j to A. Further, D defines random functions R j,i−1 , R j,i−1 as above. In addition, for identity id = id 1 . . . id n ∈ ID, we will define
as shown below. Further, during the experiment, D returns the i -th secret key extraction query in instance j for an identity id , with prefix id | i not a prefix of an already queried identity in instance j, as
for all (j, i ). (Note that id | i could be a valid prefix in any other instance different to j. Further, we assume that A queries at most q user secret keys per instance.) For an identity prefixes id | i that is a prefix of an already queried identity in instance j, let (j, i ) ∈ [µ] × [q ] be the index of that query. In that case, D returns
for all j. (Note that we use SampH to rerandomize the H 2n+1 -subgroup element of T j,i .) Further, A may adaptively query its Enc -oracle; for A-chosen instance-j challenge identity id * j,i = id * j,i ,1 . . . , id * j,i ,n ∈ ID and equal-length messages (M * j,i ,0 , M * j,i ,1 ) and returns
to A, for s j,i ← Z * N , for g ← SampG(pp), for fixed b ← {0, 1}, for all (j, i ). (Note that a modified Enc-input is provided with only 4n instead of 4n + 2 elements. Nevertheless, the omitted elements are not needed to generate a valid ciphertext (since it is consistent with the challenge identities (id * j,i ) j,i ). Hence, we assume that Enc works as desired.) Eventually, A outputs a guess b . D outputs 1 if b = b and A is valid in the sense of (µ, q)-IBE-IND-CPA, else outputs 0.
Analysis. Note that the provided master public keys yield the correct distribution. For the A-requested user secret keys, we have that since h and h have nontrivial H-elements of coprime order (again, this is due to ENDSG's orthogonality and non-degeneracy properties), the random functions R j,i−1 , R j,i and R j,i−1 , R j,i yield the correct distributions in the sense of Game 2.i.1 and Game 2.i.2, respectively. Due to the G-and H-subgroups property of ENDSG, g −(2i−1) and g −(2i−1) as well as g −2i and g −2i are uniformly distributed over the generators of their respective nontrivial subgroups of G 2n and, thus, (g −(2i−1) g −(2i−1) ) s and (g −2i g −2i ) s , for s ← Z * N , are distributed uniformly over the generators of their respective nontrivial subgroup of G 2n . Further, if id * j,i ,i = 0, then it holds that R j,i (id * j,i | i ) = R j,i−1 (id * j,i | i−1 ) and all required components g −(2i−1) to create the challenge ciphertexts are given. Analogously, if id * j,i ,i = 1, then we have R j,i (id * j,i | i ) = R j,i−1 (id * j,i | i−1 ) and all necessary components g −2i are provided as needed. Hence, the challenge ciphertexts and user secret keys yield the correct distribution. If (T j,i ) j,i = (h j,i ,0 , . . . , h j,i ,2n ) i , then the user secret keys are distributed identically as in Game 2.i.1. If (T j,i ) j,i = (h j,i ,0 , . . . , h j,i ,2i−1 · ( h) γ j,i , h j,i ,2i · ( h) γ j,i , . . . , h j,i ,2n ) j,i , then the user secret keys are distributed identically as in Game 2.i.2. Thus, (5) follows. 
for all i ∈ [n] \ {1}.
Proof. In Game 2.i − 1.2, challenge ciphertexts are of type (·, i − 1) and depend on the (i − 1)-th challenge identity bit while in Game 2.i.0, challenge ciphertexts are of type (∧, i − 1). This proof is very similar to the proof of Lemma 4.4 except that the challenge ciphertexts depend on the (i − 1)-th instead of the i-th challenge identity bit. 
Proof. It is easy to see that Game 3 and a potential Game 2.n+1.0 would be identical. Hence, we can reassemble the proof of Lemma 4.6 with i := n + 1 and (7) directly follows. 
Proof. In Game 4, we replace each challenge message M j,i ,b , for challenge bit b ∈ {0, 1}, with a (fresh) uniformly random k-length bitstring R j,i ← {0, 1} k . We argue with ENDSG's nondegeneracy property and the universality of H for this change. Concretely, for instance-j Game-3 challenge ciphertexts
for g ← SampG(pp), for g ← SampG(pp, sp), for s j,i ← Z * N , for all i ∈ [q], note that e(( g 0 ) s j,i , R j,n (id * j,i )) = e(( g 0 ) s j,i , h) γ j,i , for uniform γ j,i ∈ Z * ord(H) , is uniformly distributed in a nontrivial subgroup G T ⊂ G T due to the non-degeneracy property of ENDSG. Furthermore, since A is a weak adversary, all the R j,n are for different preimages and thus independently random. Hence, since H is a (randomly chosen) universal hash function, we have that SD ((H, H(X)) ; (H, U )) = O(2 −k ), for X ← G T and U ← {0, 1} k . A union bound yields (8) . 
Proof. In Game 4, for (uniform) challenge bit b ∈ {0, 1}, we provide A with challenge ciphertexts that include a uniform k-length bitstring instead of a A-chosen b-dependent message, for each instance and challenge. Hence, b is completely hidden from A and (9) follows.
Taking (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7) , (8) , and (9) together, shows (1) .
From weak to full (µ, q)-IBE-IND-CPA security. The analysis above shows only weak security: we must assume that the adversary A never asks for encryptions under the same challenge identity and for the same scheme instance twice. We do not know how to remove this restriction assuming only the abstract properties of ENDSGs. However, at the cost of one tight additional reduction to (a slight variant of) the Bilinear Decisional Diffie-Hellman (BDDH) assumption, we can show full (µ, q)-IBE-IND-CPA security. Concretely, in Game 3, challenge ciphertexts for A are prepared using (the hash value of) e( g s 0 , h γ ) as a mask to hide the plaintext behind. Here, g s 0 and h are public (as part of the ciphertext, resp. public parameters), s is a fresh exponent chosen randomly for each encryption, and γ is a random exponent that however only depends on the scheme instance and identity. (Thus, γ will be reused for different encryptions under the same identity). Hence, if we show that many tuples ( g s i , e( g s i 0 , h γ )) (for different s i but the same γ) are computationally indistinguishable from random tuples, we obtain that even multiple encryptions under the same identity hide the plaintexts, and we obtain full security.
Of course, the corresponding reduction should be tight, in the sense that it should not degrade in the number of tuples, or in the number of considered γ.
A (subgroup) variant of the BDDH assumption (s-BDDH). For any PPT adversary D, we have that the function
is negligible in k, for (pp, sp) ← SampP(k, n), for g ← SampG(pp), for g = ( g 0 , . . . , g n ) ←
SampG(pp, sp), for h specified in sp, for e specified in pp, and for (uniform) a, b, c, z ← Z * N .
Rerand a (N, g, g a , g, g a , g b
where gā = (gā 0 , . . . , gā n ), for
gā = ( gā 0 , . . . , gā n ), for gā 0 = ( g a 0 ) r 1 · g t 1 0 = g a·r 1 +t 1 0 and gā i = ( g a i ) r 1 · g t 1 i = g a·r 1 +t 1 i , for all i ∈ [n],
If z = abc, thenā is uniformly distributed in Z N and T a = Tā bc . If z = abc, thenā is uniformly distributed in Z N and T a = e( g 0 , h) zr 1 +bct 1 , where zr 1 + bct 1 is uniformly distributed in Z N .
Rerand b (N, g, g a , g, g a , g b 0 , h, h b , h c , T) samples r 2 , t 2 ← Z * N and outputs
If z = abc, thenb is uniformly distributed in Z N and T b = T abc . If z = abc, thenb is uniformly distributed in Z N and T b = e( g 0 , h) zr 2 +act 2 , where zr 2 + act 2 is uniformly distributed in Z N .
Rerand c (N, g, g a , g, g a , g b
If z = abc, thenc is uniformly distributed in Z N and T c = T abc . If z = abc, thenc is uniformly distributed in Z N and T c = e( g 0 , h) zr 3 +abt 3 , where zr 3 + abt 3 is uniformly distributed in Z N .
Rerand abc (N, g, g a , g, g a , g b 0 , h, h b , h c , T) outputs (gā, gā, gb 0 , hb, hc, T abc ) by running Rerand a (N, g, g a , g, g a , g b Description. D is provided with challenge input (pp, g, g a , g, g a , g b 0 , h, h b , h c , T), where T is either e( g 0 , h) abc or e( g 0 , h) z , for (pp, sp) ← SampP(k, 2n), for g ← SampG(pp), for g = ( g 0 , . . . , g n ) ← SampG(pp, sp), for h specified in sp, for e specified in pp, and for a, b, c, z ← Z * N . First, D samples (msk j ) j ← (H) µ , sets mpk j := (pp, H, m(msk j )), for all j, for H ← UH, for m specified in pp, and sends (mpk j ) j to A. Further, D defines a truly random function R : [µ] × {0, 1} n → h . During the experiment, D answers instance-j extraction queries for id ∈ ID as Ext(pp, msk j · R(j, id ), id ; SampH(pp)), for all j. Further, A may adaptively query its Enc -oracle; for A-chosen instance-j challenge identity id * j,i = id * j,i ,1 . . . , id * j,i ,n ∈ ID and equal-length messages (M * j,i ,0 , M * j,i ,1 ) ∈ (M) 2 , for all (j, i ) ∈ [µ] × [q]. For each fresh instance-j challenge identity id * j,i (i.e., id * j,i was not queried before by A in instance j), D computes (g a j,i , g a j,i , g b j,i 0 , h b j,i , h c j,i , T j,i ) ← Rerand abc (N, g, g a , g, g a , g b 0 , h, h b , h c , T) and returns
is the index of that previous query in instance j), D computes
to A, for all (j, i ). Eventually, A outputs a guess b . D outputs 1 if b = b and A is valid in the sense of (µ, q)-IBE-IND-CPA, else outputs 0.
Analysis. The master public keys yield the correct distribution as well as the requested user secret keys. If T = e( g 0 , h) abc , then the challenge ciphertext exponents (as rerandomized in Rerand abc and Rerand a , respectively) are distributed O(2 −k )-close to the challenge ciphertext exponents in Game 3. (See rerandomization paragraph above.) For a fresh challenge identity id * j,i , we have that
where ( * ) holds due the orthogonality property of ENDSG. Note that we (implicitly) set s j,i := a j,i and γ j,i := b j,i ·c j,i . For a requeried challenge identity id * j,i , we rerandomize the previously used query value a j,i , for index (j, i ), and leave γ j,i fixed. Otherwise, if T = e( g 0 , h) z , then the challenge ciphertext exponents are distributed O(2 −k )-close to the challenge ciphertext exponents in Game 4, i.e., we have that
) a j,i , H(e((g 0 g 0 ) a j,i , msk j · h z j,i )) ⊕ M * j,i ,b ), for some uniform a j,i ∈ Z * N and z j,i := z j,i a −1 j,i ∈ Z * N with overwhelming probability. Further, since H is a (randomly chosen) universal hash function, we have that SD ((H, H(X)) ; (H, U )) = O(2 −k ), for X ← G T and U ← {0, 1} k . Finally, via a union bound, (10) follows. .
Correctness of ENDSG co . For all k, n ∈ N and group parameters (G, H, G T , N, e, g, h, (g i ) i ) ← G(k, 4), we have:
Associativity. For all s, r ← Z * N , for all (g s 1 , g s·w 1 ) ← SampG(pp; s), for all (h r , h r·w · R 4 ) ← SampH(pp; r), for R 4 = (R i ) i ∈ (G p 4 ) n , it holds that e(g s 1 , h r·w i · R i ) = e(g s 1 , h r·w i ) = e(g s·w i 1 , h r )for all i ∈ [n], and for w = (w 1 , . . . , w n ) ∈ (Z * N ) n .
Projective. For all s ← Z * N , for all h ∈ H, it holds that m(h ) s = e(g 1 , h ) s = e(g s 1 , h ). (Note that g s 1 is the first output of SampG(pp; s).) Security of ENDSG co . Let G be a composite-order group generator as defined above, for all k, n, ∈ N, for all (pp, sp) ← SampP(k, n), we have:
Orthogonality. For h, h specified in sp, we have m( h) = e(g 1 , h) = e((g p 2 p 3 p 4 ) γg 1 , (g p 1 p 3 ) γ h ) = 1, m( h) = e(g 1 , h) = e((g p 2 p 3 p 4 ) γg 1 , (g p 1 p 2 ) γ h ) = 1for suitable exponents γ g 1 , γ h , γ h ∈ Z * N . Further, for g s 1 , g s 2 , and g s 3 that are the first outputs of SampG(pp; s), SampG(pp, sp; s ),
and SampG(pp, sp; s ), for s, s , s ← Z * N , we have e(g s 1 , h) = e(g s 1 , h) = e(g s 2 , h) = e(g s 3 , h) = 1. G-and H-subgroups. Since g 1 , g 2 , and g 3 are generators of subgroups G p 1 , G p 2 , and G p 3 of coprime order, the outputs of SampG, SampG, and SampG are uniform over the generators, which generates nontrivial subgroups of G of coprime order. Since h is a generator of H and R 4 is uniform over the generators of (G p 4 ) n , the output of SampH is uniformly distributed over the generators of H.
Non-degeneracy. For the first output g s 2 of SampG(pp, sp; s) (with uniform s ∈ Z * N ), and for h ∈ G p 2 p 3 as specified in sp, it holds that e(g s 2 , h) = e(g 2 , h) s is uniformly distributed over the generators of the subgroup generated by e(g 2 , h). Similarly, for the first output g s 3 of SampG(pp, sp; s), it holds that e(g s 3 , h) = e(g 3 , h) s is distributed uniformly over the generators of the subgroup generated by e(g 3 , h).
Left-subgroup indistinguishability 1. We prove the following lemma Lemma 5.2 (DS1 implies LS1). For any PPT adversary D with running time t on LS1 of ENDSG co as defined above there is a distinguisher D on DS1 with running time t ≈ t such that Adv ds1 G,D (k) = Adv ls1 ENDSGco,G,D (k, n),
for G as defined above. Hence, LS1 holds under DS1.
Proof. Description. The challenge input to D is provided as (pars, T), where T is either g 1 ← G p 1 or g 12 ← G p 1 p 2 , for pars = (G, G T , N, e, g, g 1 , g 3 , g 4 ). First, D sets the public parameter as pp := (G, H := G, G T , N, g, e, m, n, pars ), for m : h → e(g 1 , h ), pars := (g 1 , g 4 , g w 1 , h := g, h w ), for w ← (Z * N ) n , and for some integer n determined by D . Then, D sends (pp, T, T w ) to D. Finally, D outputs a value which D forwards to its own challenger.
Analysis. Note that pp is distributed as defined in LS1. If T = g 1 , then (g 1 , (g 1 ) w ) is distributed as the output of SampG(pp) as needed and, hence, Pr [D (pars, g 1 ) = 1] = Pr [D(pp, (g 1 , (g 1 ) w )) = 1] follows. Otherwise, if T = g 12 , then (g 12 , (g 12 ) w ) is distributed as SampG(pp) · SampG(pp, sp), for suitable sp, as desired and, hence, we have that Pr [D (pars, g 12 ) = 1] = Pr [D(pp, (g 12 , (g 12 ) w )) = 1]. As a consequence, (13) follows.
